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The empirical evidence on the role of a demographic marriage squeeze in the Indian 
dowry inflation of the last century has been mixed. Moreover, Anderson (2005) argues in 
a theoretical setting, that a population growth-led marriage squeeze must cause dowry 
deflation if the spousal age gap is to narrow over time. In this paper, I show that the 
apparently contradictory findings of the economic literature are perfectly consistent with 
each other. I demonstrate, using Anderson’s theoretical framework, that a demographic 
squeeze may lead to higher dowries in the periods of the squeeze compared with periods 
of no squeeze. Furthermore, I show that data drawn from such a dowry path can replicate 
the results obtained in the empirical literature on the Indian dowry inflation. I conclude 
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The practice of transfer of goods and services at marriage has been observed
in many traditional societies. When the transfers made are from the bride to
the groom they are referred to as ￿ dowry￿ , while the reverse transaction is called
￿ bride price￿ . In India, both dowry and bride price have been practised, often
concomitantly, in di⁄erent parts of the country, with the north typically paying
dowry and the south bride price.
In the latter half of the last century, a sharp rise in dowries was observed
in north India and several regions of the south were observed to switch from
bride price to dowry (Epstein (1973), Billig (1991, 1992), Rao (1993)). A popular
explanation for this dowry in￿ ation is the ￿ marriage squeeze￿hypothesis, (Bhat
and Halli (1999), Billig (1991, 1992), Caldwell et al (1982, 1983), Epstein (1973),
Rao (1993)) which attributes the phenomenon to population growth. The argu-
ment runs as follows: a higher rate of population growth leads to larger numbers
of younger relative to older cohorts in the population. When older men marry
younger women (as in India), this leads to an excess supply of brides in the mar-
riage market, causing a bidding up of the price of grooms, viz. dowry in￿ ation.
The Indian population started to grow in the 1930s and the dowry in￿ ation was
observed to begin around the 1950s, which is about the time the babies of the
￿ boom￿reached marriageable age. This makes the marriage squeeze hypothesis a
plausible explanation for dowry in￿ ation in India.
How does the empirical evidence comport with this hypothesis? I focus on two
distinct, albeit related, correlations within the empirical literature, which I call
the ￿ time e⁄ect￿and the ￿ squeeze e⁄ect￿ . These are, respectively, the correlation
between dowries paid and year of marriage, and the correlation between dowries
paid and the ratio of women to men at their ideal ages of marriage (which is an
indicator of the strength of the marriage squeeze).
Rao (1993) ￿nds a signi￿cant positive association between the marriage squeeze
indicator and dowries1. Rao also ￿nds a positive (but insigni￿cant) association
between dowries and the year of marriage, a¢ rming the view that a dowry in￿ ation
had occurred in the period between the 1920s and 1970s (the range of years of
marriage in his data). Thus Rao ￿nds a positive squeeze e⁄ect as well as a positive
time e⁄ect. Edlund (2000) repeats Rao￿ s analysis using the same data but fails
1Each of the analyses - Rao (1993), Edlund (2000) and Dalmia and Lawrence (2005) - run
linear regressions of net dowry payments on the marriage squeeze indicator, year of marriage
and a set of other controls such as the characteristics of brides, grooms and their families.
1to reproduce his results. Although she ￿nds a positive association between the
marriage squeeze indicator and dowries, this is no longer signi￿cant in her analysis.
However, she too ￿nds a positive (insigni￿cant) association between dowries and
the year of marriage.
Dalmia and Lawrence (2005) conduct a similar analysis to Rao￿ s but using a
di⁄erent dataset. They ￿nd a positive but insigni￿cant association between the
marriage squeeze indicator and dowries for the all-India regression. However, their
analysis shows a signi￿cantly negative association between the year of marriage
and dowries over the period between the 1950s and 1990s (the range of years of
marriage in their data), which seems to contradict the fact of the dowry in￿ ation
in India.
It would appear, therefore, that the empirical evidence for the marriage squeeze
hypothesis is mixed at best. While the time e⁄ect (the association between dowries
and the year of marriage) is positive in two of the studies cited above, it is sig-
ni￿cantly negative in the third. Also, while each of these studies ￿nds a positive
squeeze e⁄ect (the association between dowries and the marriage squeeze indica-
tor), the e⁄ect is not always signi￿cant.
Furthermore, in a recent paper, Anderson (2005) argues, using a theoretical
framework, that a demographic marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry in￿ ation.
She demonstrates that if, following the onset of a marriage squeeze, the age gap
between spouses narrows and all women continue to marry (as has been observed
in India and many other societies), then dowries must decline over time, and
a dowry de￿ation has to occur in the periods of the squeeze. In other words,
Anderson￿ s model implies a negative time e⁄ect during the periods of the squeeze.
Anderson￿ s result, coupled with the inconclusive ￿ndings of the empirical lit-
erature, suggest that a demographic marriage squeeze cannot be a potential ex-
planation for dowry in￿ ation. I argue here that this is not the case.
In this paper, I present a uni￿ed interpretation that explains the apparently
contradictory ￿ndings in the literature in a single consistent setting. I demonstrate
that Anderson￿ s (2005) theoretical model is consistent with both the positive time
e⁄ect found by Rao (1993) and Edlund (2000) and the negative time e⁄ect found
by Dalmia and Lawrence (2005); it is also consistent with the positive squeeze
e⁄ect found in all three empirical studies. Since the only shock to the marriage
market in the theoretical model comes from population growth, I conclude that a
demographic marriage squeeze remains a plausible explanation for dowry in￿ ation
in India.
I begin by constructing a numerical example that uses Anderson￿ s two-sided
2matching framework to show that dowries can rise from their initial steady state
level in the ￿rst period of the marriage squeeze. Although dowries must then
decline over time ￿the negative time e⁄ect highlighted by Anderson ￿these sub-
sequent payments could still be higher, in every period of the squeeze, than the
payments that prevailed in the initial steady state equilibrium with zero popula-
tion growth. Thus population growth can in theory lead to higher dowries, even
within Anderson￿ s framework. Figure 1 depicts the dowry path for this numerical
example.
The jump in dowries in the ￿rst period of the squeeze follows from the fact
that old women appropriate a lower utility from marriage than do young women in
the initial steady state equilibrium, because the ideal age of marriage for women
is ￿ young￿ . The onset of the marriage squeeze forces women to postpone marriage
and accept a lower utility level as an older bride, thereby causing dowries to be bid
up in the ￿rst period of the squeeze. I show that a low outside option of marriage
of women and a high ideal age gap between spouses are su¢ cient to generate a
dowry path similar to the one in my example.
Note, however, from Anderson￿ s result and my example, that a one-period
population growth cannot lead to a persistent rise in dowries over time. Is the
dowry path exhibited in my example then inconsistent with the empirical evidence
on dowry in￿ ation as observed in India?
To answer this question, I use data simulated from my numerical example to
run OLS regressions akin to Rao, Edlund and Dalmia and Lawrence. I demon-
strate that the initial dowry hike (see Figure 1) may account for the positive
(linear) association between dowries and year of marriage in Rao and Edlund,
because in their data the years of marriage range from periods before the squeeze
sets in to just after. Dalmia and Lawrence use data from later periods, so the
negative association with year of marriage that they obtain is also perfectly con-
sistent with the theory. This resolves the apparent inconsistency in the sign of
the time e⁄ect obtained by di⁄erent researchers.
Next, I show that in my simulated data, the ratio of women to men at the
ideal age of marriage declines over the periods of the squeeze. Since marriage
payments also decline over the periods of the squeeze (as shown by Anderson
and demonstrated by my example), dowries are highest when the squeeze (as per
this ratio) is strongest. This suggests a positive association between dowries and
the squeeze indicator used in the empirical literature ￿a positive squeeze e⁄ect ￿
which again matches the empirical evidence.
Recall that the simulated data stem from a theoretical example where the only
3shock to the marriage market is population growth. Within the framework of this
example I am able to replicate the seemingly contradictory empirical results of
Rao, Edlund and Dalmia and Lawrence ￿positive and negative time e⁄ects, and
positive squeeze e⁄ects. This demonstrates that a population growth-led marriage
squeeze could indeed be an explanation for the dowry in￿ ation observed in India.
2. The Model
This section outlines Anderson￿ s theoretical structure. It is a brief reproduction
of Section 2 in Anderson (2005).
Time is discrete and an equal number, N, of males and females are born in
each period. Women prefer to marry at age b and men at age g, where b < g.
Agents marry either at the desirable ages (b;g) or later. Let ab (ag) denote the
number of years beyond the ideal age of marriage that the bride (groom) actually
marries. The costs associated with delaying marriage beyond the ideal age are
represented by c(ab) and k(ag), which are increasing and convex. Marriages are
monogamous and there is full information and costless search in the marriage
market. Dowry payments, d; are made from the bride to the groom ￿these are
derived endogenously and vary by agents￿respective ages at marriage, ab and ag,
and potentially also by the time period of marriage. Let the dowry payment made
in period t by a woman of age ab to a man of age ag be represented by d(ab;ag;t).
Assume, for simplicity, that all bene￿ts and costs of marriage occur in one
period only and that individuals do not discount the future. Consider the following
quasilinear speci￿cation of utility of a bride:
U(ab;ag;t) = ￿d(ab;ag;t) ￿ m(ag) ￿ c(ab) (u1)
where the disutility from marrying an older groom is represented by m(ag). This
cost is also increasing and convex. Costs are normalized so that m(0) = c(0) = 0:
Similarly, a groom￿ s utility from marrying is
V (ab;ag;t) = d(ab;ag;t) ￿ k(ag) ￿ q(ab) (u2)
where the disutility from marrying an older bride is represented by q(ab) which is
also convex. Here too, costs are normalized such that k(0) = q(0) = 0.
If unable to ￿nd a partner, women obtain a utility of U and men, V . These
are the outside options of marriage to women and men, respectively.2
2Note the distinction between ￿ reservation utility￿and ￿ outside option of marriage￿ . The
42.1. Marriage Market
Marriage market equilibrium requires the satisfaction of three conditions:
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b ￿ 0; a￿
g ￿ 0 and ￿ 1 < t < 1; where S(am;t) denotes the supply
of individuals of age am (m = b;g) in the marriage market in period t.
former is the lifetime utility that agents are guaranteed if they do not marry at a certain age,
say x. The outside option is the utility obtained from never marrying. The two are equal only
when agents may not ￿nd a partner upon postponing marriage beyond age x. The marital
surplus refers to the di⁄erence between marital utility and the outside option of marriage (see
footnote 3).









b) ￿ V ].
52.2. Population Growth
Assume that there is a one-shot population growth in period 0 in which ￿N males
and females are born (1 < ￿ < 2). From period 1 onwards the birth rate reverts
once again to N boys and girls in each period.
In period b, there will be more women (￿N) than men (N) in the marriage
market, hence some women of the ideal age b must postpone marriage. If all
these women eventually ￿nd a partner ￿i.e. if there is continuing universality
of marriage ￿then the spousal age gap will narrow over time. Alternatively, the
age gap will remain the same but the number of single women in the population
will be observed to rise. This paper shall focus on the former case of universal
marriage and narrowing spousal age gap, since this ￿ts the empirical evidence on
India.
3. Example: Population growth and dowry in￿ ation
This section outlines an example in which population growth leads to dowry in-
￿ ation and a narrowing of the spousal age gap. Consider the following functional















g = b + 2
Since we are interested in the empirically observed case where all agents even-
tually marry and the spousal age gap narrows over time, I shall assume that older
women are matched ￿rst when men are indi⁄erent to the age of spouse. Also,
when there are multiple equilibria in payments, I shall assume that each of these
payments is equally likely. That is, dowries follow a uniform distribution, viz.
d(ab;ag;t) s U[l;u] where l and u denote the lower and upper limits of the dowry
payments, determined by the reservation utilities of agents. Finally, I shall assume
that agents are informed of population dynamics only through their observation
of the marriage market. For example, if there is a one-shot population growth
6in period t, agents learn of it in period (t + b) when its impact on the marriage
market is ￿rst manifested.4
Then the following claims are true for the example cited above:5
Claim 1. Grooms must marry at age 0. Brides may marry at age 0 or 1.
Claim 1 follows from the the fact that the participation constraints of both
brides and grooms are not satis￿ed except at ag = 0 and ab = 0 or 1. Henceforth,
I shall refer to women of age ab = 0 as ￿ young￿and those of age ab = 1 as ￿ older￿
women. Clearly, the ideal age of marriage for women is ￿ young￿ .
Claim 2. Suppose the population and marriage market are in a steady state
equilibrium with zero population growth (i.e. N boys and girls are born in every
period) and identical expected dowry payments over time, viz. Ed(ab;ag;t) =
Ed(ab;ag;t + 1). Then women prefer marriage at age 0 to marriage at age 1.
Claim 2 follows from two facts. First, women value marriage more, ceteris
paribus, when they marry at the ideal age. Second, when age-speci￿c (expected)
dowry payments are the same over time, women expect to pay a higher dowry
if they postpone marriage beyond the ideal age, since men prefer young to older
brides. Hence, in a steady state equilibrium with no population growth and con-
stant dowries, women (and men) marry at the ideal age.
Claim 3. Suppose that the population is initially in a steady state equilibrium
with zero population growth (N boys and girls are born in every period) and
constant expected dowries. Let a one-time population growth occur in period 0,
i.e. ￿N boys and girls are born in period 0 (1 < ￿ < 2) and N boys and girls
are born in periods t > 0. Then dowry payments will be higher in period b than
in periods t < b. Dowry payments will decline in the periods of the marriage
squeeze, viz. b ￿ t ￿ (g ￿ 1); but are higher in these periods than prior to b.
To understand the intuition of Claim 3, consider the composition of the mar-
riage market in di⁄erent periods, when all agents ￿nd a partner in their lifetime
and the spousal age gap narrows over time, . Let ft
i(mt
j) denote the number of
unmarried women (men) of age ab = i (ag = j) in any period t. Then the marriage
market structure is as follows:6
4Recall that it is in period (t + b) that the baby girls of the population ￿ boom￿enter the
marriage market in search of a partner. Boys of the ￿ boom￿generation do not enter the market
till period (t + g), hence the marriage squeeze extends from periods (t + b) to (t + g ￿ 1).
5Proofs are provided in Appendix A.



























The marriage squeeze operates in periods b to (g ￿ 1) when there are more
women than men in the market.
What are the equilibrium marriage payments corresponding to the marriage
market structure described in Table A? In the steady state equilibrium with zero
population growth, the number of ideal brides and grooms is exactly equal. Since
there is one groom for every bride there may be multiple payments consistent with
such an equilibrium, but women will extract a positive surplus from marriage even
at the maximum feasible dowry payment. This is because at the maximum dowry
that women are willing to pay, they receive the expected utility from postponing
marriage to the next period. The women in the market, being of the ideal age b,
know that they can ￿nd a partner if they postpone marriage by a period7. Hence
even at the maximum dowry, they are not reduced to their outside option of never
￿nding a partner and appropriate a positive post-payments marital surplus.
A backward induction approach demonstrates how equilibrium payments are
determined in the periods of the squeeze, b ￿ t ￿ (g ￿ 1). Notice that in period
g, the number of women and men in the market are exactly equal. Hence there
will again be multiple payments in this period, with the limits determined by the
reservation utilities of agents. Since there are both young and older women in the
marriage market in this period, they may both be reduced to their reservation
utility. Moreover, since older women may not ￿nd a match in the next period of
their lives, their reservation utility is equal to the outside option of marriage.
Consider the marriage market in the previous period (g ￿ 1). Competition
for a spouse in this period will ensure that the marital utility of young women is
The marriage market structure in Table A has been formulated assuming that this is true.
7Note that women of age (b+1) must be able to ￿nd partners (at appropriate payments), else
the marriage squeeze could not have been accompanied by a narrowing of the spousal age gap.
This is ensured by the assumption that older women are matched ￿rst when men are indi⁄erent
to the age of the bride.
8equal to the expected utility of older women in period g. In other words, young
women in period (g ￿ 1) must bid up dowries to the point that they receive the
expected marital utility of older women in period g.
Compare now the expected marital utilities of young women in period (g ￿1)
and of those in periods t < b. In the steady state equilibrium (t < b), young
women were guaranteed a marital utility greater than the outside option, even
at the maximum feasible dowry payments. Note also that the maximum feasible
payments ￿hence, the minimum marital utility of young women ￿were driven by
the disutility of postponing marriage to age ab = 1, viz. ￿3 (see (u1) and (A)). In
period (g ￿ 1), however, young women foresee the possibility of being compelled
to postpone marriage and be reduced to the outside option in the next period.
Since the outside option of marriage is far less than the (dis)utility of marrying at
ab = 1, (recall U = ￿15), the expected utility of young women in (g ￿ 1) is lower
and they pay a higher dowry than do women in the steady state equilibrium8.
By Anderson￿ s argument, however, dowry payments must decline over the
periods of the squeeze, from b to (g ￿ 1). This is because the young women who
postpone marriage in any period of the squeeze ts value it less in the next period
due to their having passed the ￿ ideal￿age of marriage. Hence they should be
willing to pay less for a groom in period (ts + 1) than as young women in period
ts. Since men prefer young women, the young women in period (ts +1) must pay
even less than older women in this period in order to secure a match. But this
clearly means that young women in period (ts+1) pay less dowry than did young
women in period ts:
Anderson￿ s argument implies that in the current example, the dowry paid by
young women is even higher in the periods of the squeeze before (g ￿ 1) than in
this period. Hence, the dowry in each period of the squeeze is higher than those
paid in the initial steady state equilibrium.
Thus an anticipation of lower marital utility in a future period (on account of
being compelled to postpone marriage beyond the ideal age) can raise the dowry
paid in periods of the squeeze, compared with those that prevailed before.
Table B lists the values of equilibrium dowries for this example in particular.
These are also plotted in Figure 1.
8Recall that when there are multiple equilibria, the lower limit of payments is determined by
the outside option of grooms, since they may only marry at the age g. Therefore the expected
dowry (and hence, the expected marital utility of women) depends on the upper limit of pay-
ments, determined by the reservation utility of the bride. E.g. the expected dowry is higher
(expected marital utility of women is lower) when the reservation utility of the bride is lower.
9Table B
Time (t) Min d(0;0;t) Max d(0;0;t) Ed(0;0;t)
t < b ￿5 7 1
b 14 14 14
b + 1 = g ￿ 1 8 8 8
g ￿5 7 1
t ￿ g + 1 ￿5 7 1
Notice that after an initial jump in the ￿rst period of the squeeze, dowries
decline over time in subsequent periods of the squeeze. Anderson focuses on this
￿ negative time e⁄ect￿to conclude that a demographic marriage squeeze cannot be
responsible for dowry in￿ ation. But this conclusion is incomplete. To correctly
resolve the issue of whether a population growth-led marriage squeeze can cause
dowry in￿ ation, we need to ask two questions. First, can population growth lead
to a marriage squeeze (de￿ned as the phenomenon of there being more potential
brides than grooms in the marriage market)? And second, can a marriage squeeze
lead to higher dowries? In other words, we need to focus on the squeeze e⁄ect,
not the time e⁄ect in the periods of the squeeze.
It is clear that in the dowry path exhibited above, the answer to both of
these questions is ￿ yes￿ . The only shock to the marriage market in this example
is a one-shot population growth, and this leads to there being more brides than
grooms in the market; hence population growth can lead to a marriage squeeze.
And the dowries paid in those periods when there are more brides than grooms
in the market are higher than those paid when there are equal numbers of brides
and grooms; hence a marriage squeeze can lead to higher dowries. Thus, even
though dowries decline over time after the onset of the squeeze (the negative time
e⁄ect), they may still be higher in those periods than in the initial steady state
equilibrium with zero population growth (a positive squeeze e⁄ect).
The above example demonstrates that population growth can lead to a nar-
rowing of the spousal age gap, continuing universality of female marriage and
higher dowries in the periods of a population-growth-led marriage squeeze. Hence
the marriage squeeze hypothesis remains a plausible theoretical explanation for
dowry in￿ ation.
There remains the question of whether this theoretical explanation ￿ts the
empirical evidence. Speci￿cally, Anderson￿ s model and my example both indicate
that population growth cannot lead to persistent dowry in￿ ation over time. Is the
10model then inconsistent with the Indian data? I return to this question in a later
section.
4. Su¢ cient Conditions for Dowry In￿ ation
Under what conditions will a dowry path like that in Figure 1 be observed? In
this section, I show that a low outside option of marriage for women and a high
ideal age gap of spouses are su¢ cient to cause higher dowries in periods of the
squeeze compared with periods of no squeeze.
Suppose there is a one-shot population growth as assumed by Anderson. To be
consistent with the empirical observation of declining spousal age gaps and uni-
versality of marriage, I focus on paths that guarantee the same. I shall, therefore,
continue to assume that older women are matched ￿rst when men are indi⁄erent
to the age of the bride. Also, as before, I assume that when there are multiple
equilibria, payments follow a uniform distribution over the feasible range and that
the population and marriage market is in an initial steady state equilibrium with
zero population growth. Lastly, I shall assume, that men may marry at age ag = 0
and that women may marry at age ab = 0 or 1.
Before presenting the su¢ cient conditions for a squeeze-led dowry in￿ ation, I
shall outline the various forms of in￿ ation that may occur. These are presented
in De￿nition 1.
De￿nition 1. Suppose that the population and marriage market are in a steady
state equilibrium with zero population growth. Consider a one-shot population
growth in period 0. Dowry in￿ ation in the periods of the squeeze ts (b ￿ ts ￿ g￿1)
can take the following forms:
1. Dowries in each period of the squeeze are higher than the maximum dowry
in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e. d(0;0;ts) > Max d(0;0;t < b)
for all ts
2. The dowry in the ￿rst period of the squeeze (b) is higher than the maximum
dowry in the initial steady state equilibrium,
i.e. d(0;0;b) > Max d(0;0;t < b) for all ts
3. Dowries in each period of the squeeze are higher than the expected dowry
in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e. d(0;0;ts) > Ed(0;0;t < b) for all
ts
11Note that dowry in￿ ation of type 1 is a su¢ cient condition for dowry in￿ ation
of types 2 and 3. Hence, type 1 is the most stringent variety of dowry in￿ ation.
The example presented in the previous section demonstrates dowry in￿ ation of
type 1.
In the propositions that follow, I shall outline su¢ cient conditions for the
di⁄erent forms of dowry in￿ ation de￿ned above.
Lemma 1 provides a necessary condition for the existence of a path in which
all women ￿nd a partner in their lifetime9.
Lemma 1. Suppose that men may marry at age ag = 0 and women at age ab = 0
or 1. Consider a one-shot population growth in period 0. A necessary condition
for all agents to continue to marry in the periods ts of the marriage squeeze
b ￿ ts < g, is that
d(0;0;b) =
V ￿ U + (2g ￿ 2b ￿ 1)[q(1) + c(1)]
2
￿ ￿U (p1)
This is the participation constraint of young women in the ￿rst period, b, of
the marriage squeeze.
Lemma 1 follows from the fact that on any payments path that guarantees
universality of marriage, the composition of the marriage market in each period
must be as given in Table A. The only payments path that is consistent with
this composition of the marriage market is the one that is derived by backward
induction using the equilibrium payments that must exist in period g. For this
path to be feasible however, the highest possible dowry payment - in the ￿rst
period of the squeeze, b - must be feasible. Condition (p1) in Lemma 1 states the
participation constraint of women - which ensures the feasibility of the equilibrium
dowry payments - in period b.
Propositions 1 and 2 outline su¢ cient conditions for dowry in￿ ation when a
one-shot population growth (in period 0) is accompanied by a narrowing of spousal
age gap and continuing universality of marriage10.
Proposition 1. Suppose that men may marry at age am = 0 and women at age
ab = 0 or 1. Suppose that (p1) holds. Let ts denote the periods of the marriage
squeeze, b ￿ ts < g. Then the following statements are true:
9See proof in Appendix B.
10See proofs in Appendix C and D respectively.
121. If the ideal age gap is greater than 2, the dowry in each ￿ squeeze￿period is
higher than the maximum dowry in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e.
d(0;0;ts) > Max d(0;0;t < b) for all ts if (g ￿ b) > 2:
2. If the ideal age gap is 2, then the form of dowry in￿ ation depends on whether
(p1) binds. In particular,
1. if (p1) does not bind, the dowry in each ￿ squeeze￿period is higher
than the maximum dowry in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e.
d(0;0;ts) > Max d(0;0;t < b) for all ts if (g ￿ b) = 2 and (p1) does
not bind
2. if (p1) binds, then
1. the dowry in each ￿ squeeze￿period is higher than the expected
dowry in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e. d(0;0;ts) >
Ed(0;0;t < b) for all ts if (g ￿ b) = 2 and (p1) binds; also,
2. the dowry in the ￿rst ￿ squeeze￿period (b) is higher than the maxi-
mum dowry in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e. d(0;0;b) >
Max d(0;0;t < b) if (g ￿ b) = 2 and (p1) binds.
3. If the ideal age gap is less than 2, then the form of dowry in￿ ation depends
on whether (p1) binds. In particular,
1. if (p1) does not bind, then the dowry in each ￿ squeeze￿period is higher
than the expected dowry in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e.
d(0;0;ts) > Ed(0;0;t < b) for all ts if 0 < (g ￿ b) < 2 and (p1) does
not bind
2. If (p1) binds, there is no dowry in￿ ation, because the dowry in each
period of the squeeze is equal to the expected dowry in the initial
steady state equilibrium, i.e. d(0;0;ts) = Ed(0;0;t < b) for all ts if
0 < (g ￿ b) < 2 and (p1) binds.
Proposition 2 relaxes the assumption that women must marry by age ab = 1.
Proposition 2. Suppose that men may marry at age am = 0 and women at
any age ab ￿ 0. Let ts denote the periods of the marriage squeeze, b ￿ ts < g.
Consider the path on which the spousal age gap narrows and there is universality
of female marriage. Then the following statements are true:
131. The dowry in each period of the squeeze is higher than the expected dowry
in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e. d(0;0;ts) > Ed(0;0;t < b) for all
ts
2. If the cost of marrying a bride of age ab > 1 is su¢ ciently high for both
the bride and groom, then the dowry in each ￿ squeeze￿period is higher than
the maximum dowry in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e. d(0;0;ts) >
Max d(0;0;t < b) for all ts if [q(am) + c(am)] is ￿ su¢ ciently convex￿ , i.e. if
q(2)+c(2)
q(1)+c(1) > 3
3. If the ideal age gap is su¢ ciently high, then the dowry in the ￿rst period of
the squeeze is higher than the maximum dowry in the initial steady state
equilibrium, i.e. d(0;0;b) > Max d(0;0;t < b) if (g ￿ b) > 2:5 ￿
q(2)+c(2)
2[q(1)+c(1)]
Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that on a path that guarantees universality
of female marriage, a low outside option of marriage for women, U, and a high
ideal age gap of spouses, (g ￿ b), are su¢ cient to cause higher dowries in the
periods of the squeeze.
To see the intuition of the above, consider the necessary condition for
universality of female marriage (p1). Notice that a low value of U guarantees the
satisfaction of this condition because a low outside option of marriage ensures
that women are willing to pay a high dowry rather than remain single. But a low
value of U also lowers the reservation utility of old women in period g, and hence,
by backward induction, lowers the expected utilities of young women in previous
periods of the squeeze. This causes young women to bid higher dowries in those
earlier periods of the squeeze.
If the di⁄erence in ideal ages of marriage of men and women is high,
then the squeeze lasts for a longer stretch of time. Since dowries must decline
over the periods of the squeeze, the longer the squeeze extends the higher must
be the equilibrium dowry in the ￿rst period, b.11 Hence, a low outside option
from marriage and a high ideal age gap of spouses ensure that dowries are higher
during the squeeze than in the initial steady state equilibrium, if all agents are to
eventually ￿nd a partner in their lifetime.
11Recall that the equilibrium dowries in period g are determined by the reservation utilities
of men and women. Hence the expected dowry in period g is independent of the length of the
squeeze. Since dowries in previous periods are derived by backward induction, the longer the
length of the squeeze, the higher the dowry in the ￿rst period, b.
14When parameters are such that women may marry beyond age ab = 1,
the reservation utility of ￿ older￿women (ab = 1) in period g depends on the costs
of marrying at the age ab = 2. The higher these costs ￿q(2) and c(2) ￿relative
to the utility from marrying at age ab = 1 (governed by q(1) and c(1)), the lower
the reservation utility of older women and the higher the maximum and expected
dowry paid by them in period g. Since the dowries in previous periods are derived
by backward induction from the expected dowry in period g, high values of q(2)
and c(2) relative to q(1) and c(1) also ensure that dowries are higher in the periods
of the squeeze.
Therefore, a low outside option of marriage for women and a high ideal spousal
age gap can ensure a squeeze-driven dowry in￿ ation.
Interestingly, observations on the Indian marriage market have been quite
consistent with the su¢ cient conditions outlined above. Rao points out that "in
the Indian marriage market there are strong social and economic pressures for
women to be married within an ￿ acceptable￿age range... This is due both to
a lack of job-market opportunities for women, as well as to an extreme drop in
social status associated with having (or being) an older unmarried daughter." This
suggests a low outside option of marriage of Indian women, i.e. a low U. The
age gap at marriage has also been relatively high in India compared with other
countries. Bhat and Halli (1999) estimate the di⁄erence in singulate mean age of
marriage of men and women in India to be 6.9 years in 1911; the gap declined
to 5.4 years in 1951. Festy￿ s (1973) estimation of the di⁄erences in mean age
of marriage of men and women in Canada, USA, Australia and New Zealand in
1911-1915 are, respectively, 2.7, 2.8, 2.6 and 2.3 years. In 1936-1940, the estimates
of the age gaps in these countries were, respectively, 2.5, 2.4, 3.6 and 3 years.
5. Theory versus Empirical Evidence
In the previous sections, I have shown that a one-period population growth can
lead to a higher dowry in each period of the squeeze compared with periods of
no squeeze. However, the dowry in￿ ation is not persistent over time since dowry
payments must decline once the squeeze sets in. Does this violate the evidence on
the dowry in￿ ation in India? Inconsistency of the theory with the evidence would
indicate that while population growth can cause higher dowries in theory, it could
not have been the reason for the dowry in￿ ation as observed in India. In this
section, therefore, I investigate if the dowry path demonstrated by the example
in Section 2 is consistent with empirical evidence on dowries in India.
15To do so, I attempt to test if data simulated from the example can replicate
the ￿ndings in the empirical literature (Rao (1993), Edlund (2000), Dalmia and
Lawrence (2005)).
In the ensuing analysis, I assume that there is a single period population growth
in which 1:5N boys and girls are born, following which the initial birth rate of
N boys and girls is reverted to. Also, all other assumptions made in previous
sections hold. Table 1 presents the data generated from my example, under these
assumptions. I use 14 time periods such that the squeeze begins in period 6,
lasting till period 7. The marriage market composition presented in Table A and
the assumed birth rates yields the ratio of women to men at ideal age in each
period. In the empirical literature, this ratio has been used as an indicator of the
marriage squeeze.
I use the above data ￿simulated from my example ￿to run OLS regressions
of dowry payments on the marriage squeeze indicator and year of marriage. I
run regressions separately for all 14 periods and also for the early periods (t < 8)
and the later periods (t > 4). Henceforth, I shall refer to these regressions (that
use simulated data) as ￿ theoretical￿regressions. As I shall discuss in the following
paragraphs, the early periods￿theoretical regression (Table 2, column (13)) is akin
to those run by Rao and Edlund whereas those using later years (Table 2, column
(15)) is akin to that of Dalmia and Lawrence.
I use two measures of the marriage squeeze in my analysis. The ￿rst is an
indicator variable for whether a particular time period is a period of squeeze. The
second is the indicator used in the empirical literature ￿the ratio of women to
men at the ideal age of marriage. The results of these theoretical regressions are
presented in Table 2.
The ￿rst point to note in the results is that the coe¢ cient on the indicator of
the squeeze is positive in each theoretical regression, regardless of how the squeeze
is measured ￿the positive ￿ squeeze e⁄ect￿ . This re￿ ects the theoretical prediction
that dowries are, on average, higher when the squeeze is stronger. As Figure 1
shows, dowries are indeed higher in each period that there is a squeeze than in
each period that there is not (the ￿rst measure of the squeeze). Moreover, as the
data in Table 1 demonstrates, the ratio of women and men at the ideal age of
marriage is declining over the periods of the squeeze. Since dowries also decline
over the periods of the squeeze, once again dowries are highest when the squeeze
is strongest. In this sense, therefore, the squeeze can ￿ cause￿dowry in￿ ation.
How does the above ￿nding line up with the empirical evidence? Table 3
presents the coe¢ cients on the marriage squeeze indicator and year of marriage
16obtained by Rao, Edlund and Dalmia and Lawrence. The sign on the squeeze
indicator is positive in all three studies, just as obtained in Table 2 (Panel 2).
Hence, the e⁄ect of the squeeze predicted by the theoretical example does not
contradict the evidence obtained from empirical studies.
The second important point to note in the theoretical regressions is that the
sign of the coe¢ cient on the year of marriage depends on which periods of the
dowry path the data is drawn from. In the regressions using the early periods
(Table 2, columns (4), (13)), dowries are increasing with year of marriage whereas
in regressions of the later periods (Table 2, columns (7), (15)), they are decreas-
ing. Both these e⁄ects are consistent with the results obtained in the empirical
literature. In the data used by Rao and Edlund, the year of marriage ranges from
the 1920s to the 1970s ￿the period before the squeeze hits to just after. They both
obtain a positive association between year of marriage and dowries (as in Table
2, column (13)). In Dalmia and Lawrence￿ s data, the years of marriage belong
to the period after the squeeze has begun ￿the 1950s to the 1990s. As predicted
by the theoretical regressions, they obtain a negative association between year of
marriage and dowries (as in Table 2, column (15)).
Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that the theoretical regressions can match the
signs of coe¢ cients in the regressions conducted in the empirical literature. Note,
further, that dowry in￿ ation of the least stringent type ￿type 3 (see De￿nition
1) ￿is su¢ cient to generate the results of the theoretical regressions presented
here. The path presented in Figure 1 also demonstrates the more stringent form
of dowry in￿ ation, viz. type 1.
The analysis above underlines, once again, the important distinction between
the ￿ squeeze￿e⁄ect and the ￿ time￿e⁄ect of population growth on dowries. In point-
ing to the dowry de￿ ation that must occur after the squeeze has set in, Anderson
highlights the ￿ time￿e⁄ect, controlling for the squeeze. This is demonstrated by
the negative coe¢ cient on period of marriage when the ￿rst measure of the squeeze
￿the indicator for period of squeeze ￿is used (Table 2, Panel 1). But the time
e⁄ect is not the whole story. In order to determine if a marriage squeeze can cause
dowry in￿ ation, it is necessary to focus on the e⁄ect on dowries of measures of
the squeeze. The theoretical regressions make the clear distinction between these
two e⁄ects and in doing so, also successfully predict the signs of the coe¢ cients
that have been obtained in the empirical literature.
Lastly, recall that in the data used in the theoretical regressions, the only shock
to the marriage market is population growth and the associated squeeze. Hence,
the fact that the results obtained in the empirical literature can be replicated
17using this data clearly indicates that population growth can have a role to play in
the dowry in￿ ation observed in India. A demographic marriage squeeze, therefore,
remains a plausible explanation for the dowry in￿ ation observed in India.
6. Summary and Conclusion
A population growth-led marriage squeeze has been a much-cited explanation for
the Indian dowry in￿ ation of the last century. However, empirical evidence on
the role of the squeeze in the Indian dowry in￿ ation has been mixed. Moreover, a
recent theoretical paper by Anderson argues that there must be dowry de￿ation in
the periods of the squeeze, if the empirically observed facts of narrowing spousal
age gap and universality of marriage are to be ensured.
The combined ￿ndings of the theoretical and empirical literature on dowry
in￿ ation are puzzling and hard to reconcile with each other. In particular, they
undermine the potential signi￿cance of the marriage squeeze hypothesis as an
explanation for dowry in￿ ation.
In this paper, I bring together the ￿ndings of the economic literature on the
Indian dowry in￿ ation to demonstrate that they are perfectly consistent with each
other and with the marriage squeeze hypothesis. I show, using a numerical ex-
ample based on Anderson￿ s theoretical framework, that population growth can
in theory lead to a narrowing of the age gap between spouses, universality of
female marriage and higher dowries in the periods of the squeeze. I also demon-
strate that a low outside option of marriage for women and a high ideal age gap
between spouses are su¢ cient to generate a dowry path similar to that in my
example. Finally, I use data simulated from this example to run regressions akin
to those found in the empirical literature on the Indian dowry in￿ ation. I show
that the signs on regression coe¢ cients obtained in the empirical literature can
be replicated using the simulated data from the theoretical dowry path.
Since the only shock to the marriage market in the simulated data comes from
population growth and the associated squeeze, the replicability of empirical results
clearly indicates that the squeeze can have a role to play in dowry in￿ ation, as
observed in India. Hence, the marriage squeeze hypothesis remains a plausible
explanation for the Indian dowry in￿ ation of the twentieth century.
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Upper and lower limits of marriage payments in the steady state
equilibrium with zero population growth
Expected equilibrium marriage payments in period t
1By assumption, dowry payments d(0,0,t) follow a uniform distribution U[-5, 7]  when
there may be multiple equilibrium payments, viz. in periods t < b and t > b+1.
Note: The marriage squeeze against women operates in periods b and (b+1).
20Table 1: Data for Theoretical Regressions in Table 2
Period of 
Marriage (t) Dowry







6 14 1 1.5
78 1 1
8 1 0 0.666
91 0 1
10 1 0 1
11 1 0 1
12 1 0 1
13 1 0 1
14 1 0 1
a These are the expected dowries paid in marriages of men and women of the ideal 
age (see Table B and Figure 1)
b Computed, based on the assumption that there is a single period population growth 
in which the birth rate grows from N boys and girls to 1.5N boys and girls. (See 
Table A for the marriage market composition in each period.)
21Table 2: 'Time' and 'Squeeze' Effects in Theoretical Regressions using Simulated Data from Table 1
Dependent Variable: Dowry on the Equilibrium Path
Panel 1: Measure of Squeeze: Indicator Variable for Period of Squeeze
All t Early t (t < 8) Late t (t > 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Period of marriage (t) -0.101 - -0.013 1.679 - -0.286 -0.764 - -0.05
If period of squeeze - 10 9.984 - 10 11 - 10 9.813
Constant 3.187 1 1.102 -2.857 1 1.857 10.255 1 1.512
Observations 14 14 14 7 7 7 10 10 10
R-squared 0.01 0.9 0.91 0.49 0.89 0.89 0.27 0.9 0.9
Panel 2: Measure of Squeeze: Ratio of Women to Men at the Ideal Age of Marriage
All t Early t (t < 8) Late t (t > 4)
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Period of marriage (t) - -0.031 - 1 - -0.531
(Women/Men) at ideal age 17.417 17.337 23.667 19 17.191 15.341
Constant -15.195 -14.88 -21.5 -20.5 -14.476 -7.547
Observations 14 14 7 7 10 10
R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.75 0.89 0.6 0.72
Note 1: There is a single period population growth in which the birth rate grows from N boys and girls to 1.5N boys and girls.
Note 2: Column (13): akin to Rao (1993), Edlund (2000)
Note 3: Column (15): akin to Dalmia and Lawrence (2005)
22Table 3: 'Time' and 'Squeeze' Effects in the Empirical Literature on Dowry Inflation in India
Dependent Variable: Net Dowry Transfer
a
Measure of Squeeze: Ratio of Women to Men at Ideal Age of Marriage
Early t (Mean ≈ ≈ Late t (Mean ≈ 1979, SD ≈ 9)  1954, SD   10)
Rao (1993) Edlund (2000): Table 4
b Edlund (2000): Table 5
c Dalmia and Lawrence (2005): 
All India
Year of marriage (t) - 281.16 - 288.33 - 552.65 -0.08
(0.9) (0.8) (1.50) (26.93)
(Women/Men) at ideal age 81,547.00 71,423.00 34,341.94 22,000.31 25,720.32 7062.73 0.16
(2.5) (2.1) (1.5) (0.8) (1.1) (0.3) (0.56)
Observations 141 141 127 127 127 127 1037
R-squared 0.129 0.128 0.126 0.123 0.291 0.3 0.5264
t statistics in parentheses
a Rao and Edlund use net dowry transfer in constant 1984 rupees, Dalmia and Lawrence use net dowry transfer in constant 1994 rupees. All regressions 
have controls for characteristics of the bride, groom and their families. Other controls used are location, labor force participation ratio, distance of 
marriage migration etc.
b Replication of Rao's results, using difference in the bride's and the groom's traits as controls (see Edlund (2000), pp.1331)
c Traits of the bride and groom are included individually in the controls (see Edlund (2000), pp. 1332-33)
23APPENDICES
A. Example
A.1. Proof of Claim 1
Proof. For the participation constraint of brides and grooms (of age ab and ag
respectively) to hold simultaneously, we require, (see (m1:1) and (m1:2))
k(ag) + q(ab) + V ￿ d(ab;ag;t) ￿ ￿U ￿ m(ag) ￿ c(ab)
a necessary condition for which is:
k(ag) + m(ag) + c(ab) + q(ab) ￿ ￿(V + U) (A:1)
where am ￿ 0 (m = b;g).
Notice that a necessary condition for (A:1) is that it be true at ab = 0, since
c(:) and q(:) are minimized at ab = 0.
Consider ag = 1;ab = 0. At this value, (A:1) is not satis￿ed since the left
hand side is 30 and the right hand side is 20. Since the left hand side is increasing
in ag for ag > 0, this means that (A:1) is not satis￿ed for all ag ￿ 1;ab ￿ 0.
At ag = 0;ab = 0, (A:1) is satis￿ed.
Hence, men may only ￿nd a willing partner when they are of age ag = 0.
Since grooms must marry at age 0 (see previous claim), let us now consider
matches in which grooms are of age 0:
At ab = 1;ag = 0; (A:1) is satis￿ed since the left hand side is 6 and the right
hand side is 20. This means that (A:1) is true for ab = 0;1 (ag = 0) since the left
hand side is increasing in ab for ab ￿ 0.
At ab = 2;ag = 0; (A:1) is not satis￿ed since the left hand side is 24 and the
right hand side is 20. Hence (A:1) is not true for ab ￿ 2;ag = 0:
Hence women may marry at ages 0 or 1.
A.2. Proof of Claim 2
Proof.
Expected lifetime utility from marrying at age 0 = ￿Ed(0;0;t) ￿ m(0) ￿ c(0)
(A:2)
24Expected lifetime utility from marrying at age 1 = ￿Ed(1;0;t) ￿ m(0) ￿ c(1)
(A:3)
where Ed(:) denotes expected dowry payments.
Suppose that women prefer to marry at age 1 in period (t + 1) than at age 0
in period t. Then, from (A:2) and (A:3), we have:
￿Ed(0;0;t) ￿ m(0) ￿ c(0) < ￿Ed(1;0;t + 1) ￿ m(0) ￿ c(1) (A:4)
Also, men of age 0 must prefer to marry women of age 1 in (t + 1). This is
true if:
￿k(0) ￿ q(0) + Ed(0;0;t + 1) < ￿k(0) ￿ q(1) + Ed(1;0;t + 1) (A:5)
Adding (A:4) and (A:5); we get:
Ed(0;0;t + 1) ￿ Ed(0;0;t) < ￿q(1) ￿ c(1) (A:50)
At the intitial steady state equilibrium, Ed(0;0;t + 1) = Ed(0;0;t). Hence
(A:50) implies:
0 < ￿q(1) ￿ c(1)
which is clearly not satis￿ed since q(1) = 1 > 0; c(1_ ) = 1 > 0.
Hence, at the initial steady state equilibrium, women prefer to marry at ab = 0.
Men have to marry at age 0, since they cannot ￿nd partners at ages higher than
0.
A.3. Proof of Claim 3
Proof. I shall demonstrate this claim by using backward induction to compute
the equilibrium marriage payments in each period. The payments are determined
by the marriage market structure in each period, outlined in Table A.
First, I shall solve for the steady state equilibrium payments in t < 0 and
t ￿ g + 1. Note that in these periods the number of men and women in the
marriage market are perfectly matched. Hence there will be multiple equilibria in
marriage payments since neither party has a credible threat point for marriage.
The stability conditions of women (see (m2:1)) yields:
d(0;0;t) ￿ Ed(1;0;t + 1) + c(1)
25Conbined with the stability constraint of men (m2:2), this becomes
d(0;0;t) ￿ Ed(0;0;t + 1) + q(1) + c(1) (A:6)
From the participation constraint of men (m1:2) we obtain
d(0;0;t) ￿ k(0) ￿ q(0) ￿ V ￿ 0 (A:7)
where V = ￿5 is the outside option of marriage of men.
(A:6) and (A:7) yield the condition
V ￿ d(0;0;t) ￿ Ed(0;0;t + 1) + q(1) + c(1) (A:8)
Note that since the number of men and women are exactly equal marriage
payments may settle anywhere in this range. Suppose that each of these payments
are equally likely, i.e. dowries follow a uniform distribution. Then we have
d(0;0;t) s U[V ;Ed(0;0;t + 1) + q(1) + c(1)]
so the expected payments in each period t such that t < b or t ￿ (g + 1), are
Ed(0;0;t) =
V + Ed(0;0;t + 1) + q(1) + c(1)
2
Ed(0;0;t) = Ed(0;0;t + 1) = q(1) + c(1) + V (A:9)
In the case of the present example, we have (using (A:8) and (A:9)):
Ed(0;0;t) = Ed(0;0;t + 1) = 1 (A:10)
￿5 ￿ d(0;0;t) ￿ 7
in periods t; t < b or t ￿ (g + 1).
Next I will determine the equilibrium payments in period g. In this period too,
there may be multiple equilibria in marriage payments since the total number of
men and women in the marriage market are equal.
Using the above analysis once again, the equilibrium dowries paid by young
women is obtained to be
Ed(0;0;g) = q(1) + c(1) ￿ 5 (A:11)
26The participation constraint of older women (m1:1) and that of men marrying
older women (m1:2) yield the condition,
￿5 + q(1) ￿ d(1;0;g) ￿ ￿c(1) + 15
Again, assuming d(1;0;g) s U[￿5 + q(1); ￿c(1) + 15] we get
Ed(1;0;g) =
q(1) ￿ c(1) + 10
2
(A:12)
In the present example, therefore, we have
Ed(0;0;g) = 1 (A:13)
￿5 ￿ d(0;0;g) ￿ 7
Ed(1;0;g) = 5
￿2 ￿ d(1;0;g) ￿ 12
I shall now determine the equilibrium payments in period (g ￿ 1) = (b + 1).
Using the stability constraint of young women (m2:1) and (A:12); we get
d(0;0;g ￿ 1) =
q(1) + c(1) + 10
2
(A:14)
Older women￿ s payments are then (in order to satisfy the stability constraint
of men):
d(1;0;g ￿ 1) =
q(1) + c(1) + 10
2
+ q(1) (A:15)
In the present example, we have
d(0;0;g ￿ 1) = 8 (A:16)
d(1;0;g ￿ 1) = 11
Finally, I determine the equilibrium payments in period b.
Using the stability constraint (m2:1) and (A:14), young women￿ s payments are
determined by (recall g = b + 2),
d(0;0;b) =
3q(1) + 3c(1) + 10
2
(A:17)
27In the present example this is
d(0;0;b) = 14 (A:18)
Using (A:10);(A:13);(A:16) and (A:18), I can outline the dowry path in the
present example:
Ed(0;0;t) Ed(1;0;t) Min d(0;0;t) Max d(0;0;t)
t ￿ b ￿ 1 1 ￿ ￿5 7
t = b 14 ￿ 14 14
t = b + 1 = g ￿ 1 8 11 8 8
t = g 1 5 ￿5 7
t ￿ g + 1 1 ￿ ￿5 7
where ￿ denotes that there are no unmarried women of age ab = 1 in the
market in this period.
Therefore, when there is a one-time growth in the population in period 0,
average dowries paid by young women rise in period b and subsequently decline
in the periods of the marriage squeeze b ￿ t ￿ (g ￿ 1). This is represented
diagrammatically in Figure 1.1.
Also, the dowry paid in each period of the squeeze (b ￿ t ￿ g ￿ 1) is higher
than the steady state dowry levels.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose that men marry at age ag = 0 and women at ab = 0 or 1.
Consider a one-shot population growth in period 0 in which the birth rate rises
from N to ￿N (1 < ￿ < 2).
If the spousal age gap is to narrow and all women continue to marry, then it
must be the case that older women (ab = 1) are matched ￿rst in each period. This
implies a unique marriage market structure, viz. that presented in Table A. The
marriage payments on this path (derived by backward induction as in Appendix
A) are given by:
d(0;0;g ￿ k) =
V ￿ U + (2k ￿ 1)[q(1) + c(1)]
2
(B:I)
where k ￿ (g ￿ b)
28A necessary condition for this dowry path to be feasible, is that the highest
dowry on this path (in period b) is feasible. This implies, from (B:I) and (m1:1),
d(0;0;b) =
V ￿ U + (2g ￿ 2b ￿ 1)[q(1) + c(1)]
2
￿ ￿U (p1)
(putting k = g ￿ b in (B:I)).
C. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Applying the method of analysis presented in Appendix A, the dowries
in the initial steady state equilibrium may be derived to be:
Ed(0;0;t < b) = Ed(0;0;t + 1) = q(1) + c(1) + V (C:19)
Min d(0;0;t < b) = V
Max d(0;0;t < b) = 2q(1) + 2c(1) + V
Also, (B:I) in Appendix B derives the equilibrium dowry in each period of the
squeeze:
d(0;0;g ￿ k) =
V ￿ U + (2k ￿ 1)[q(1) + c(1)]
2
(B:I)
where k ￿ (g ￿ b):
Suppose that (p1) holds. (p1) simpli￿es to
[2(g ￿ b) ￿ 1][q(1) + c(1)] ￿ ￿(U + V ); (p10)
which is a necessary condition for a dowry path on which the spousal age gap
narrows and all women continue to ￿nd a partner.
Proposition 1 follows easily from proving the relation between (C:19) (steady
state dowries) and (B:I) (￿ squeeze￿dowries), implied by (p10); for di⁄erent ranges
of (g ￿ b).
D. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Allowing women of age ab > 1 to marry does not alter the dowries in the
initial steady state equilibrium, given by (C:19) in Appendix C.
As before I shall derive the equilibrium dowry path by backward induction
from period g. Hence, consider the dowries of older women in period g.
29The stability condition of older women (m2:1) and the participation constraint
of men (m1:2) yield:
d(1;0;g) s U[V + q(1);Ed(2;0;g + 1) + c(2) ￿ c(1)] (D:20)
The backward induction argument implies that the lower the expected dowry
(paid by older women) in period g the lower will be the dowries in all previous
periods of the squeeze. I shall focus on the minimumvalue of the expected dowry in
period g so that the conditions I obtain for dowry in￿ ation are su¢ cient conditions
for the same. To derive this, consider the possible values of Ed(2;0;g + 1).
Participation constraints of men of age 0 and women of age 2 imply:
V + q(2) ￿ Ed(2;0;g + 1) ￿ ￿U ￿ c(2) (D:21)
Suppose that Ed(2;0;g + 1) = Min d(2;0;g + 1) = V + q(2), (from (D:21)).
Then, from (D:20)
Ed(1;0;g) =
2V + q(2) + c(2) + q(1) ￿ c(1)
2
(D:22)
Therefore, in period (g ￿ 1), we have (from (m2:1)):
d(0;0;g ￿ 1) = V +
q(1) + q(2) + c(1) + c(2)
2
(D:23)
Using (C:19) in Appendix C and (D:23) above, it is easy to show that d(0;0;g￿
1) > Ed(0;0;t < b) when:
q(1) + c(1) < q(2) + c(2) (i)
Since q(:_ ) and c(:) are increasing funcions, (i) is true. Hence the dowry in
period (g￿1) and (by Anderson￿ s argument) in all previous periods of the squeeze
are higher than the expected dowries in the initial steady state.
This proves Case 1 of Proposition 2.
By a similar analysis, once again using (C:19) in Appendix C and (D:23)
above, it is possible to show that condition (ii) below is su¢ cient to ensure that
d(0;0;g ￿ 1) > Max d(0;0;t < b)(i.e. the dowry in period (g ￿ 1) exceeds the




30Hence, by Anderson￿ s argument, (ii) implies that dowries in all previous peri-
ods of the squeeze must also exceed the maximum dowry in steady state.
This proves Case 2 of Proposition 2.
To prove Case 3, consider the equilibrium dowry that must hold in the ￿rst
period of the squeeze b. This is derived, by backward induction, to be
d(0;0;b) = V +
[2(g ￿ b) ￿ 1)][q(1) + c(1)] + q(2) + c(2)
2
(D:24)
Using (C:19) in Appendix C and (D:24) above, it is easy to show that d(0;0;b) >
Max d(0;0;t < b) when
(g ￿ b) > 2:5 ￿
q(2) + c(2)
2[q(1) + c(1)]
This proves Case 3 of Proposition 2.
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